H ealth care is struggling to come to terms with the role of accountability in a nonpunitive, system-based approach to error reduction. Even when we seem to understand the system-based causes of errors, it's still hard to let individuals "off the hook." We ask, "How can we hold individuals accountable for their actions without punishment?"
Some have even suggested that a nonpunitive approach to error reduction could lead to increased carelessness as people learn that they will not be punished for their mistakes. In an ISMP survey on perceptions about a nonpunitive culture, 21% of respondents agreed with this premise and another 16% felt that a nonpunitive approach to errors absolves staff of personal responsibility for patient safety. 1 However, a nonpunitive, system-based approach to error reduction does not diminish accountability; it redefines and directs it in a much more productive manner.
Typically, when an error happens, all accountability falls on individuals at the "sharp" end of the error, where the caregiver/ patient interaction occurs. However, accountability -not for zero errors, but for making patient safe-ty job one -should be equally shared among all health care stakeholders.
Webster's dictionary defines "accountability" as an obligation to provide a satisfactory explanation or to be the cause, driving force, or source. These definitions offer a glimpse at a more appropriate patient safety accountability model. In this model, accountability lies not in performing perfectly, but in identifying safety problems, implementing system-based solutions, and inspiring and embracing a culture of safety. The following are examples of what accountability in this culture means.
Individuals in the workforce should be held accountable for speaking out about patient safety issues, voluntarily reporting errors and hazardous situations, and sharing personal knowledge of what went wrong when an error occurs. On the other hand, health care leaders should be held equally accountable for making it safe and rewarding for the workforce to openly discuss errors and patient safety issues. They must hold regular safety briefings with staff to learn about improvement needs, discuss strategic plans, and identify new potential sources of error.
When the workforce recommends error prevention strategies, leaders must support them and provide the means necessary within a reasonable timeframe to implement technology and other system enhancements to improve efficiency and safety. Leaders should be held accountable for understanding and addressing barriers to safe practice such as distractions and unsafe workloads. Likewise, the workforce must be empowered to ask for help when needed and be willing to change practices to enhance safety and quality.
Leaders should position patient safety as a priority in the organization's mission and engage the community and staff in proactive continuous quality improvement (CQI) efforts, including annual self-assessments of patient safety. The workforce should be held accountable for working together as a team, not as autonomous individuals. Finally, leaders and staff alike need to follow the safety literature continuously and offer visible support to their colleagues who have been involved in errors.
This model of shared accountability spreads far beyond the walls of individual health care settings, encompassing licensing, regulatory, and accrediting bodies; the federal government and public policy makers; the pharmaceutical industry; medical device and technology vendors; schools for medical training; professional associations; and even the public at large. These often-overlooked participants share equal accountability for doing their part to make health care error-proof.
For example, regulatory, accrediting, and licensing bodies should be held accountable for adopting standards related to error reduction recommendations that arise from expert analysis of adverse events and scientific research. Purchasers of health care should provide incentives and rewards for patient safety initiatives. Companies that produce medical devices, pharmaceutical products, health care computers and software, and other healthrelated products should be held accountable for premarket evaluation and continuous improvement in the design of devices, products, labels, and packages.
Educators should seek out patient safety information and use it in curriculum design. Professional organizations should support local and national voluntary reporting systems and disseminate important patient safety information to their members. The public should ask questions and stay informed about their care and ways to avoid errors.
Who can argue with the multidimensional nature of medical care? Isn't it time to accept a multidimensional, shared accountability model for patient safety? Organizational leaders and other stakeholders who simply hold the workforce accountable when an error happens are inappropriately dele-gating their own responsibility for patient safety. We must stop blaming and punishing those closest to an error and instead accept a model of shared accountability that collectively translates our sincere concern for patient safety into effective, system-based error solutions.
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IV POTASSIUM INFUSIONS
The measures described in your April issue -further dilution, splitting doses, and slower infusion rates -are all viable alternatives for decreasing the likelihood of pain upon administration of KCL via peripheral vessels, with or without lidocaine [see ISMP Medication Error Report Analysis: Should Lidocaine Be Added to IV Potassium Infusions to Prevent Burning Sensation? Hosp Pharm 2004;39:308-9].
However, one element of these potential problems and errors was ignored. That is, nurses appeared to be making the KCL supplements on the floor and had access to either lidocaine or concentrated KCL (or both).
Removal of concentrated KCL from patient care areas is a simple and effective way to reduce error potential. Similarly, preparation and checking of these supplements in the pharmacy by trained technicians and pharmacists is the best method to avoid errors like those described. Pharmacy review of orders and preparation and dispensing of medications like this in ready-to-administer form is the best way to avoid errors.
The question of whether or not lidocaine should be used, though related, is a separate one from the prevention of errors in preparation.
-Michael T. Minerath, MS, RPh
Pharmacist Specialist Ann Arbor VA Healthcare System Ann Arbor, MI Author's Response I appreciate Pharmacist Minerath's comments and certainly agree that the hospital's quality assurance goals are best accomplished when admixtures are prepared by pharmacy personnel using proper facilities in the pharmacy. In addition, ISMP has long advocated that potassium chloride for injection concentrate not be stored in patient care areas.
In the case I described, there was no mention or any evidence that the potassium infusion was prepared by nurses or that potassium chloride concentrate injection was available as a floor stock item. As for lidocaine, this drug is commonly stocked in clinical areas for use as a local anesthetic and, when ordered, it is often added to IVs by nurses.
The primary purpose of the article, which included as a "crucial factor" the recommendation that lidocaine be added in the pharmacy whenever possible, was to address the safety of adding lidocaine to large-volume parenteral solutions of potassium chloride to treat infusion-associated pain.
-Michael R. Cohen, RPh, MS, ScD Institute for Safe Medication Practices
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